Communists within the Labor Movement; the facts and countermeasures

COMMUNISTS

THE LIBRARY

WITHIN THE diversity

OF TEXAS

LABOR MOVEMENT

THE FACTS AND
COUNTERMEASURES

CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE

UNITED STATES

WASHINGTON 6, D. C. 1947

1 - : s-:zr "di the proletariat] means noth-

slz ~ :t r:r less than power which directly
'- : :?. -.-.z-Ience. which is not limited by any
. -5 :: :rs:r:c:ed by any absolute rule. Dictator-
5* -Z r-rir-i — note this once and for all — unlimited
: -: resting on violence and not on law — lenin.

• • •

It is particularly important for the purpose of
winning over the majority of the proletariat, to
capture the trade unions . . . — Comintern.

• • •

The conquest of political power by the prole-
tariat is a gigantic forward step for the prole-
tariat as a class, and the Party must more than
ever, and not merely in the old way but in a new
way. educate and guide the trade unions, at the
same time not forgetting that they are and will
long remain an indispensable "school of Com-
munism" and a preparatory 7 school for training
the proletarians to exercise their dictatorship.
. . . We must be able to withstand all this, to
agree to any sacrifice, and even — if need be — to
resort to all sorts of stratagems, artifices, illegal
methods, to evasions and subterfuges, only so as
to get into the trade unions, to remain in them,
su : :o carry on Communist w T ork within them at

all COStS — LENIN.

• • •

It is inconceivable that the Soviet Republic
should continue to exist for a long period side
by side with imperialist states — ultimately one or
the other must conquer — STALIN.

• • •

We . . . stand steadfast and immovable against
Communism and totalitarianism. . . . We resent
the attempts of those who seek to utilize any
I ranch of organized labor for the purpose of

:~ rosing upon our nation a form of foreign-
:;:.:eived ideology — William green.

v- • v
COMMUNISTS

WITHIN

THE LABOR
MOVEMENT

A HANDBOOK ON

THE FACTS AND
COUNTERMEASURES

Report of

Committee on Socialism and Communism

Approved by the Board of Directors

CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF
THE UNITED STATES

WASHINGTON 6, D. C

PREFACE

THE MASTERMINDS of Communist strategy,
especially since the time of Lenin, have insisted that
the labor movement must be moved steadily left-
ward, radicalized and infiltrated. Without a leftist
labor movement the Communists stand small chance
of gaining the objective of a revolutionary destruc-
tion of our way of life.

For this reason top management in American
industry and commerce must concern itself with this
problem. Sound industrial relations as practiced by
the foreman, the division head, the industrial rela-
tions executive and top management may serve as
a check to Communist infiltration. But this is not
enough, as the following analysis reveals.

Furthermore, management alone cannot solve the
problem. The cooperation of anti-Communist work-
men and labor leaders in indispensable. The dis-
closures, along with the recommendations in this
report, should be of help to those who are aware of
the nature of the problem and who wish to do some-
thing about it.

"^Meantime, every effort must be made to set forth
the facts of Communist infiltration and strategy in
all fields — government, literary, entertainment, edu-
cation and wherever the Communists are at work.
Countermeasures in all these fields must be taken
simultaneously so that each effort will reinforce the
other.

For the person interested in these problems, we
also commend the materials listed in the bibliog-
raphy and the two earlier reports published by the
National Chamber.

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UNIVERSITY OF TULA*

AUSTEN, TULA&

THE FACTS AND
COUNTERMEASURES

INTRODUCTION

THE PROBLEM of Communism in labor rela-
tions can no longer safely be ignored. It affects
vitally the employer, the worker, and the public.
The fundamental reason for this lies in the nature
of Communism. As noted in the earlier report,
COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE
UNITED STATES, the American Communist
Party is not a political movement in the normal
sense of the term. Nor is it a reform movement com-
parable to the great surges in American history
which have altered our destiny.

Communism fundamentally is a secret conspira-
torial movement in the interests of a foreign power.
Its policies are not American-made. They are made
in Moscow and directed from Moscow. If the
interests of the Soviet Union happen to coincide
with American aims, as they did during the War,
American Communists can become "superpatriots."
When they diverge, as they have done since V-J
Day, the Red groups seek to sabotage every phase
of American life. Such sabotage is particularly
dangerous and effective in the fields of labor rela-
tions.

If Communism were merely a domestic move-
ment aiming at social reform, its tactics alone would
make it dangerous. It is utterly ruthless in its bid
for power. During the War, when all-out production
was its motto, its drives for power in the labor move-
ment seriously impeded the war effort. It promoted
factionalism and dissension and thus undermined
labor morale. Its secret plottings within unions led
to a general spirit of distrust and dissatisfaction.
Communists seem incapable of constructive efforts,
even when they try to aid the union or management
to increase production.

The immediate victim of their tactics is the em-
ployer with a Communist-controlled union. He is
subject to constant political harassment, bad faith,

and every form of deception and chicanery. Even
with the maximum of good will towards his workers,
he will find himself unable to achieve peace and
harmony. Production will suffer and costs will
mount. As one commentator puts it: "Every time
Molotov toughens up on Secretary Byrnes, the local
union comrades play rough with the foremen and
executives in plants around the country," *

Other employers suffer as well. Even where their
unions are under honest, American leadership, they
cannot insulate themselves from the trend. Some-
times they pay the price through strikes of suppliers.
At other times, they find their own union leaders
forced to parrot demands made by Communist
unions.

Gains or even demands made in one sector of the
A.F. of L. or the C.I.O. tend to repeat themselves
elsewhere. It must be remembered that the labor
movement is intensely political. If non-Communist
leaders do not gain as much as their opponents,
they may soon find themselves with an active Com-
munist opposition in their own union. The opposi-
tion makes capital of the reasonable demands of the
honest leadership. Hence irresponsibility in labor
tends to become infectious.

An illustration of this analysis can be found in
the policies of Walter Reuther. In the political
struggles of labor, Reuther is considered a leader
of the anti-Communist bloc. But at the same time,
he is the head of a union which has a powerful Com-
munist minority. He faces sabotage, not only from
this clique, but also from the national headquarters
of the C.I.O. Communist influences there have
persuaded the top leadership that Reuther is a
threat to their positions. As a result, Reuther faces
an alternative: he must either be aggressive or retire
in favor of some Communist dupe. This explains
in part the conflict in his public statements. On the
one hand, he may favor increased labor productivity
and decry inflationary wage rises. On the other
hand, he makes wage demands which cannot be
other than inflationary.

* Fortune, November 1946, p. 285.

6 *

Labor Suffers from Communism

1ABOR SUFFERS from this internecine struggle.
J Its legitimate objectives are obscured in fac-
tional struggles. It is maneuvered into expressive
and fruitless strikes. Thus, most labor leaders con-
cede today that the 1946 strikes brought >no net
gains to labor. Higher wages were offset by higher
prices. A.F. of L. leaders have been extremely crit-
ical of the C.I.O. strike policy. They consider it
political rather than economic. And one of the most
important factors in labor's political struggles is
the Communist issue.

There are many current indications that labor
realizes how the Communist menace hurts its cause.
Thus, in 1946 the heads of two C.I.O. unions re-
signed and gave as their reason Communist control
of their groups. The National C.I.O. Convention in
1946 saw fit to denounce Communist interference.
State Industrial Council (C.I.O.) meetings in Wis-
consin, Massachusetts, and New York took action
against the Communists. There were rumblings in
two other Communist-controlled unions. The first
instance of restiveness was when Joseph Curran of
the National Maritime Union engaged in an all-out
struggle with the Communist officers associated with
him. Then Lewis Merrill of the Office and Profes-
sional Workers, who has been a regular writer for
the Communist weekly, New Masses, disclaimed
Communist interference in his union, although his
sincerity in doing so has been questioned.*

It is obvious that the public is a victim in these
struggles. The shortages, inconveniences and suf-
ferings of 1946 are too recent to need detailed re-
counting. Yet, they may appear trivial compared to
possible future events. If the foreign policies of the

♦The resigning Presidents were Morris Muster, head of
the United Furniture Workers (The New York Times, July
1, 1946, p. 1) and Frank R. McGrath, head of the United
Shoe Workers (New Work World Telegram, October 3, 1946,
p. 2). For a summary of the Industrial Council moves, see
Business Week, December 28, 1946, p. 64 and January 4,
1947, p. 56. In early 1947, Joseph Curran openly charged
his fellow officials with putting Communist interests above
union interests (The New York Times, January 5, 1947,
Section 1, p. 7).

United States continue to diverge from those of
the Soviet Union, we may be in for an era of thinly
disguised political strikes. Strikes of this nature are
basically sabotage. They will not be settled in any
easy fashion.

The Present Situation

IN EARLY 1947, the problem of Communism
exists in scattered Locals of A.F. of L. unions,
and in a more serious way in international unions
as well as Locals of the C.I.O. In the A.F. of L.,
pressure from the top combined with trained and
conservative unionism on the part of the rank-and-
file have tended to keep out Communist infiltration.
Exceptions exist where there is a heavy concentra-
tion of Communists in a given region, such as New
York or Los Angeles. In these sections, many A.F.
of L. Locals and those of independent unions have
been infiltrated seriously.

By contrast, the C.I.O. has shown great weakness
in fighting Communist inroads. Furthermore, so
many of the rank-and-file are new to unionism that
aggressive pressure from the bottom has usually
been lacking. Untrained unionists have often been
quite helpless to ward off an invasion by a clever
and unscrupulous clique of Communists in a Local.
Their resentment at such tactics, however, rose to
such a pitch in 1946 that the national leadership
was forced to take some action against Red control.
At this writing, trends are confused and uncertain,
the more so since Communists are presently going
underground and concealing their identities when
this is possible.*

Master Strategy

SOME INDICATION of probable future pat-
terns may be found in the general Communist
plan for seizing power in labor, as outlined in

* For a highly competent discussion of this problem, con-
sult the new series by Andrew Avery, COMMUNIST
POWER IN INDUSTRY {Chicago Journal of Commerce,
IS cents).

8 *

Comintern schools. In Moscow plans, the primary

emphasis is upon heavy and strategic industries,
since control here is most useful for sabotage and
revolution. Among these industries are railroads and
communications, steel, and such war industries (or
potential war industries) as the automobile, farm
implement, electrical, shipbuilding, atomic energy,
and related heavy industries. In addition, penetra-
tion is sought into government either through
unions or through direct espionage. Finally, unions
which deal with office and professional workers are
penetrated by Communists, since they are used for
commercial and industrial espionage.

It will be noted that this ideal pattern conforms
with the existing plan of Communist penetration in
the United States, with the exception of steel and
railroads, where Communist success has been only
sporadic to date. In these situations, however, cur-
rent orders call for concentration of efforts to
remedy past failures to obtain control over labor.

The value of knowledge by business leaders of
the overall pattern is obvious. If they are in a field
which is considered strategic, they can count on no
respite from Communist attempts to control their
labor unions. Vigilance can never be relaxed. It does
not follow from this, however, that firms not within
the strategic category are automatically assured of
labor harmony. Control of strategic industries is not
the only labor objective of Communists. They seek
control of the labor movement as a whole; they use
it as a source of members and a medium for propa-
ganda; and they draw vast funds from captive
unions. Accordingly, if any labor situation is ripe
for exploitation, Communists will seize upon it.
The only difference between strategic and non-
strategic situations is that in the former case, the
Communists will come back again and again, no
matter how often they are defeated. In non-strategic
unions, a resounding and thorough victory over the
Red element may ensure peace for several years.

A Specialized Problem

IN DISCUSSING the problem of Communism
in labor relations, it is basic that we note its
specialized nature. Neither the average employer
nor the average worker is equipped to handle it. In-
deed, they often fail to recognize it at all. Many an
industrialist feels that labor is inherently ungrateful
and irresponsible whereas the real basis of his prob-
lem may be a Communist political machine which
has enslaved his workers as well as himself. Also
there are employers who, feeling that they know
Communist tactics, attack honest union officials as
Reds even though they are merely factual, calculat-
ing, and hard bargainers. It is a fact that labor
leaders may be forced into an intransigent position
because they are caught between two fires: the fight
against the Communists within the union, and the
bargaining with the employer to obtain minimum
concessions. Intelligent recognition of these facts by
employers would in itself lead to much more har-
monious labor relations.

The problem may be stated in another manner.
Today labor relations are not confined exclusively
to problems arising in a given plant or firm. Local
problems are important, but the sources of many
of the difficult local questions are found elsewhere.
Unless industrial relations directors have a trained
realization of the roots of their problems, they may
be very unrealistic and ineffective in handling this
type of situation locally and in making recommen-
dations to meet it. Mistrust and mutual recrimina-
tions replace genuine collective bargaining. Discus-
sions of rates of pay or conditions of employment
become academic, when a political machine is look-
ing for excuses to cause trouble.*

Purely political strikes by Communist-controlled
unions cannot as yet be called commonplace. How-
ever, before we entered the War, the North Ameri-
can Aircraft strike and the Allis-Chalmers strike
were inspired by the then current Soviet policy of
preventing aid to Hitler's enemies. More recently,

* See: Communist Power in Industry.

10*

a brief shipping strike in 1945 was politically in-
spired. Although the possibility of having more
political strikes cannot be discounted, they should
be considered the exception rather than the rule at
this time. What is much more common is the pro-
longing of an apparently economic strike for polit-
ical reasons. Thus in the 1946 Allis-Chalmers strike
a group of workers declared: "We have returned to
work after being taken to the cleaners by a bunch
of Communist revolutionaries." * This same senti-
ment was voiced by workers in two other strikes, in
Connecticut and New Jersey. Unfortunately, such a
realization often arises only after grave damage has
been done. To repeat, the diagnosis of such problems
requires expert and specialized knowledge.

Communist-Inspired Strikes

IN VIEW of probable future trends, special at-
tention should be given to the problem of the
Communist-inspired strikes. Strikes hurt. They are
injurious not only to those involved, but also to the
general public. The employer loses immediate earn-
ings and the future good will both of his workers
and his customers. To the worker, a strike means
physical and mental suffering for an uncertain goal.
Even if he attains his ends, he may be in such a
weakened economic position that he may have to
work for several years to make up for wages lost
during the strike. The general public loses when
production is interrupted and when purchases by
the strikers decline. The larger the number involved
in the strike, the greater is the public loss. At times
public health and security may be placed in
jeopardy, as was the case with the coal and power
strikes. The unions themselves usually fear strikes.
This fear is based on the heavy cost which has
often been sufficient to wreck strong Locals. Even
when a union feels that its cause is just, it still must
decide whether a struggle would be worth its pos-
sible cost.

Even with basic good will, hard bargaining at

*New York Times, Nov. 25, 1946.

*11

ktvrbruii

times leads to an impasse which may result in a
short strike. But on the whole, labor leaders know
that when management suffers, they suffer. Only in
the rarest of cases will they risk bankrupting a com-
pany in order to attain an objective. Such is not the
case with Communist-controlled unions. They are
willing to fight employers piecemeal and to cause
the maximum of confusion in the minds of the
worker and the public alike. They seek turmoil for
its own sake. They would gladly bankrupt an em-
ployer, thereby causing unemployment and building
up bitterness and hate towards all employers and
the American way of life. Hence it is vital that each
employer possess an understanding of this problem
before he is confronted with it.

One further illustration shows the implications of
Communism in labor relations, There has been
much recent discussion of labor-management com-
mittees. Much thought has been given to the ques-
tion of management prerogatives and of labor partic-
ipation in functions hitherto exclusively reserved
to management. Many employers view with sym-
pathy labor's objectives in seeking teamwork with
management. They know that cooperation aids
morale and stimulates production. But concessions
of this type to a Communist-controlled union are
most dangerous. If such committees are agreed upon,
Communists are given a wedge which enables them
to penetrate effectively into the field of management.
This in turn permits them to increase the area of
conflict and disruption. Unfortunately the fear of
such a turn of events inhibits an employer in making
such concessions even to a good Local. There are
numerous examples of generous contracts made with
fair-minded union leadership which later boomer-
anged when new faces and strange ideologies ap-
peared at the bargaining table. ■

The Case of Local 94

INSTEAD OF dealing with the problem in the
abstract, a case history may be offered. The
plant in question was in a war industry, employing

12 *

VMVERSITY OF TEXAS

Aosrim TEJUIS

forty thousand workers. Management from the be-
ginning cooperated with labor and did nothing to
hinder the formation of a union. Local 94 was con-
nected with a C.LO. union generally credited with
being non-Communist. One of the national officers,
however, was politically ambitious and connived
with Communist groups in order to gain their polit-
ical support.

At the beginning, Local 94 won recognition in a
struggle with the A.F. of L. It became bargaining
agent for twenty thousand workers. Its officers were
fairly competent, and showed an appreciation of
their responsibility. Bargaining and discussions were
hard, straight, and constructive. Then the govern-
ment expanded the contract and employment soon
doubled. New faces appeared at the union hall, and
many of them were actively interested in union
matters.

Capitalizing upon the lack of experience of the
Local's officers, a request by a few workers was
usually sufficient to bring forth the scheduling of an
official departmental meeting. What was the result?
Suddenly a request would arise for another election,
for a particular departmental shop steward. The
incumbent's term might not have expired, but his
pride in the job he had done would not permit him
to stand upon this technicality. He wanted a vote
of confidence. So he acceded to the demand and
submitted to an election. The meeting was called,
the election scheduled, the battle lines drawn. The
incumbent did not realize that the meeting was
packed with a roving group of employees from other
departments. Suspicions could not be proved and
election was by acclamation. Naturally, the incum-
bent was ousted — the Communist infiltration had
begun.

The next move was a decision to print a weekly
paper. This decision was made at a sparsely at-
tended union meeting. Volunteer editors were im-
mediately available, all of them Communist. From
the very first edition, management was deprecated,
belittled, and lied about. Malicious and personal
attacks were made upon supervisory personnel.
This gutter sheet plumbed the depths in its vitriolic

* 13

■

«

invective. And it had its effect in a new plant; this
was a shop whose workers had little personal knowl-
edge of any operations, other than those in their
own immediate section. They had migrated from
almost every State of the Union, and had no knowl-
edge of the previous history of personal accom-
plishments by which to judge either management or
their fellow workers. As a result, the vicious lies
obtained credence, and bargaining became very
strained.

At this juncture, the Communist faction pro-
ceeded to attack and undermine the existing union
officers. This was done by prolonging union meet-
ings until impossible hours. General membership
meetings started at 8:00 p.m. and now might con-
tinue until 2:00 or 3:00 a.m. These meetings began
to be called more and more frequently and upon
any pretext. This proved to be a terrific strain upon
the health of the officers, all of whom worked in the
plant. Their shift started at 6:00 a.m. and they
could not afford to remain away from work. More-
over, they were concerned over the vicious rumors
being circulated against them, and wished to show
an example of industry and zeal. Like the shop
stewards, they lost their heads and decided to call
for an election as a show of confidence. This they
did in the middle of their terms.

In the meantime, the Communists had built up
a good political machine at the plant. By capturing
shop steward jobs, they were able to process
grievances and build a following. Their slanderous
rumors against the officers were having their effect.
At the same time, they were cultivating minority
groups, particularly the Negroes and members of
some national groups. Aiding in this process was the
anti-Negro bias of a vice-president of the Local.
As a result, the incumbents were thoroughly de-
feated, and a group of Communists along with their
dupes were swept into power. In this Local, the
Communists as such were satisfied to take over the
posts of business agent and secretary. The president
was a weak tool in their hands. Other posts went
to ambitious leaders who could command votes.
The power behind the throne was a shrewd, dis-

14*

barred lawyer, who was a New York Communist
who preferred "war work" to the Army. Later the
State Communist chairman took direct personal
command of strategy in union meetings by sending
messages from a nearby restaurant.

The Results of Communist Control

UNDER Communist leadership, agitation was
the order of the day. Turbulence and strife
were deemed necessary to keep and to extend con-
trol of the Local. This policy of turmoil posed a
difficult problem for the local leaders, when the
Party Line called for all-out production. They
solved their problem by giving up agitating through-
out the entire plant and instead concentrated on
irritating stoppages, "quickies," and slow-downs,
all involving small numbers of workers strategically
located. Numerically more significant were the
noon-time protest meetings. Actually they were less
vital, since the men were on their lunch period.
Their presence did not impede production, nor did
it even necessarily indicate interest of those present
in the subject discussed. However, in this way, Com-
munists hoped to continue agitation without inter-
fering substantially with production, the USSR be-
ing under vigorous attack by the Nazis. In fact
production dropped off twenty per cent. As a result,
they gave up "demonstration tactics," and confined
themselves to exploiting grievances. The slightest
complaint would be magnified out of all proportion,
and processed through all the steps of the grievance
procedure. Reasonable, factual data meant nothing
to them. Every grievance lost was automatically ap-
pealed to the higher steps in the procedure.

Within the Local a terrific all-out effort was made
to eliminate this group of Communist disturbers.
Charges were placed against individual members of
the group and a trial was held which was unneces-
sarily extended over too long a period of time, at
considerable financial loss to those making the
charges. This was a period of turbulent charges
and counter charges, and appeals to the Inter-

*15

national. Here, however, a combination of weak
leadership on the one hand and the influence of the
pro-Communist International officer on the other
hand, prevented decisive action. (Actually things
became so bad that Communists came within a
hair's breadth of taking over the International
Only after the War, and with the contraction of the
industry, did the non-Communist leadership again
become secure.) But within the Local, the bitter
struggles tended to disgust decent members, who
stayed away from union meetings and failed to vote
in elections. Some of the dissidents went over to the
A.F. of L. and tried unsuccessfully to change the
affiliation of the Local. An adverse National Labor
Relations Board decision on this matter was con-
sidered favorable to the Communist group.

During this whole struggle, attendance at Local
meetings fell off. With a claimed local membership
of nearly thirty thousand, it was not unusual to
have less than a hundred persons present at general
membership meetings. Usually a majority of these
were Communists or their sympathizers. If they
were uncertain of their majority, they would stage
a disturbance and disrupt the meeting. Even when
an active, but not too intelligent, anti-Communist
faction formed, attendance rarely reached three
hundred. Communist caucusing and knowledge of
parliamentary maneuvers usually enabled them to
outwit their opponents. As an incidental point, the
fact that Communists and their dupes numbered
less than a hundred at meetings shows the effective-
ness of their tactics. A few dozen trained organizers
were able to control absolutely the union policy of
forty thousand workers.

The situation was cleared up only when the In-
ternational stiffened its attitude and suspended the
autonomy of this and several other Communist-
controlled Locals. Trained administrators were sent
to take over the Locals and what was left of the
finances. In this particular instance they found that
hundreds of thousands of dollars had been directly
dissipated in Communist causes. This Local did not
have a serious strike during the War, but not a
cent was left of the million dollars collected in dues.

16 *

As a result of this episode, the workers suffered, the
employer was plagued continuously, and the war
effort was impeded. This is a typical, not an excep-
tional, Communist situation.

Reaction to Communist Dictatorship

THE CASE of Local 94 was described in detail,
because it represents a pattern which is found
elsewhere. Wherever the Communists either control
a union or seek to control it, the same elements will
be found: unrest, low morale, disturbed production,
and, within the union, complete dictatorship. Em-
ployers find themselves in positions where nothing
they do will satisfy the insatiable demands made by
the leadership of the Local. They may find them-
selves embroiled in long and exhausting strikes.
Such certainly was the case with Allis-Chalmers.
Significant in this connection is a letter which this
company sent to its workers on October 11, 1946.
The firm presented to the employees photostatic
evidence that the leaders of their local union had
signed the nominating papers for a Communist can-
didate for Governor of the State of Wisconsin.

The result of the application of this "common
pattern" is best demonstrated and expressed by
the attitude of business men as described in Modern
Industry (November 15, 1946). The tabulation of
the survey shows that if managements who now deal
with the C.I.O., where the problem of Communism
is most severe, were allowed a choice, only 9.5 per
cent would continue with the C.I.O., whereas 25
per cent of the group would prefer to deal with the
A.F. of L. Of the employers who now deal with
A.F. of L. unions, not a single one could be found
to prefer the C.I.O. It is reasonable to infer that
the strictly trade union practices of both groups
do not differ greatly. After all, the C.I.O. began
with unions which split off from the older group.
The one point of major difference probably is the
irresponsibility induced by the political activities of
Communists, although some non-Communists in
the CJ.O. talk in terms of class warfare.

* 17

How to Recognize the Problem

IN THE LIGHT of the preceding analysis, it
is clear that the Communist problem is real in
industrial relations. Yet it can still happen that an
employer faces or will shortly face such a situation,
and remain entirely unaware of his danger. He may
know that his troubles have increased tremendously,
but may blame the situation on general national
conditions. Accordingly, it is vital that employers
and their industrial relations executives become
trained to recognize and to combat this problem.

Recognition on the general level demands some
knowledge of both Communist literature and anti-
Communist studies and publications. The most
authentic Communist publications nationally are
the Daily Worker and the Worker (Sunday), and
Political Affairs. There are also a number of authen-
tic local or regional Communist periodicals. In
addition, an industrial relations director should
consult the publications of Communist-controlled
unions.

Useful studies by opponents are: COMMUNIST
INFILTRATION IN THE UNITED STATES
(Chamber of Commerce of the United States) ;
THE COMMUNIST FIFTH COLUMN and
COMMUNIST POWER IN INDUSTRY (Chi-
cago Journal of Commerce) ; THE COMMUNIST
IN LABOR RELATIONS TODAY (Research In-
stitute of America) ; and the periodicals Plain Talk
and the New Leader. (See bibliography.)

From these sources, an industrial relations direc-
tor can obtain the general "line" and jargon of the
Communist Party. He will learn which issues are
considered important at the moment. Indeed, he
may be able to obtain from Political Affairs a rather
detailed blueprint of the collective bargaining de-
mands which he is likely to meet when his contract
expires. In addition, he learns which unions and
persons are favored or opposed by the Party.

Naturally, a national edition of the Communist
press cannot carry sufficient details of local activi-
ties. When possible, the national press should be

18 *

supplemented by reading local or union papers.
Furthermore, the reading of the anti-Communist
press will help sharpen an executive's perception of
key Communist issues and personnel.*

With competent knowledge of the general Com-
munist line and personalities, it becomes possible
to judge the political complexion of a Local. The
material included in the union paper, if one is pub-
lished locally, is often a good guide to the type of
control. Resolutions adopted in meetings and stands
on public issues also furnish sound indications.
Knowledge of the record and history of key local
union personnel is also useful. If there has been any
tendency towards ideological factionalism in a Local
or an International, it is likely that officers will have
taken sides with one group or another. Attitudes
towards prominent union leaders engaged in such
struggles also indicate an individual's cast of
thought. Also Communists have their own distinc-
tive jargon which can be recognized by a regular
reader of their press. They label their opponents as
"Fascist," "reactionary," "imperialist," and similar
epithets fashionable in Communist circles.

Once the fact of political influence seems estab-
lished, it is then important to discover the Com-
munist leaders. It can be taken for granted that
their numbers will be insignificantly small. But they
will be surrounded by opportunists and dupes whom
they are using to consolidate their power. As a rule,
the opportunist is an able leader who will play Com-
munist labor politics for personal gain, but who
does not use their jargon or share their general
political interests. The dupe ordinarily is a weak
character with a superficial popularity. Preferably
he is from a dominant racial or religious group. He
does not use Communist jargon in his ordinary talk,
but his speeches, if he makes any, are often written
for him by the Communist leaders and may contain

* In this connection, attention should be called to two
publications by groups connected with the Association of
Catholic Trade Unionists, the Wage Earner in Detroit and
the Labor Leader in New York. These are mature labor
papers in their own right, and show a keen perception of
the Communist issue. For an analysis of the A.C.T.U.
movement, see Fortune, November, 1946, p. 188.

19

words and phrases foreign to his normal expressions.
Within the Local, Communists try to keep positions
of real power (editor, organizational director, secre-
tary, and business agent) for themselves. They may
share some of these jobs with dupes, but prefer to
give them positions which are merely honorary
(such as president). Opportunists get the remaining
jobs, and are permitted to share the shop steward
positions with the Communists. In addition, there
is likely to be a scattering of American-minded
labor leaders who associate with the Communists
because there is no other choice at the moment. If
such leaders can form a strong group, they can
often wean away the opportunists and attain to
power.

The Communist at Work

EARLIER the case history of Local 94 was pre-
sented. It will be useful now to narrow the
focus and see in detail how Communists seize power
in a Local. In this connection, it is important to
note that their methods are mainly political and
only incidentally ideological. They use political
machine tactics to gain power, knowing that once
they are in control, they will have ample oppor-
tunity for ideological propaganda.

Labor unions offer a perfect arena for the use of
all the arts in the game of politics. Their struggles
are the most bitter, skillful, and cut-throat of any
to be seen in this country, Civic politics reach their
peak only at intervals; labor politics continue in-
cessantly.

When the Communists decide to capture a Local,
they send a small group of their members to seek
employment in a plant represented by that Local.
When employed, each of these becomes extremely
active in union affairs with the hope that he can
attract a following. At the same time, these militant
agitators seek to cultivate ambitious union members
who aspire to leadership. They build up the ego of
these individuals and induce them to seek union
office. To achieve such office, these opportunists are

20 *

encouraged to be active at union meetings. If neces-
sary the Communists will supply them with ideaj
and issues. At the same time the Red caucus will
urge each of the proteges to weld his personal fol-
lowing into a compact voting group.*

The next step is to unite these several proteges
into a disciplined caucus. This group meets in-
formally and prepares its program in advance for
regular union meetings. The innocents are aided in
picking issues, and their speeches are written for
them if necessary. If they are timid in gaining the
floor, an experienced Communist parliamentarian
will gain it for them and turn it over to them.
Communists will second the motions and make
favorable speeches. The caucus and its followers
will be scattered rather widely throughout the hall
and upon signal will join in with loud applause and
lusty shouting. In no time, the motion is railroaded
through against disorganized and unprepared oppo-
sition. The fledgling caucus is flushed by its success
and anxious for further action.

In these meetings, all the devices and tricks per-
mitted by parliamentary procedure, and many that
are not, are used to the fullest. When possible,
motions are rushed through without debate. If
serious opposition forms, the meeting is delayed or
prolonged until opponents tire, give up the fight,
leave the hall, and go home. From the beginning of
the campaign, character assassination is practiced
against the leaders of the opposition. Rumors are
spread to undermine their influence with the general
membership. Every effort is made to create trouble
within the home. Anonymous letters and phone calls
reach their wives, hinting that absences from home
are not really on matters of union business. Com-
munist women are prepared to seduce any opponent
who is weak enough to fall for their wiles. Then
blackmail effectively silences opposition from this
quarter.

* For a detailed account of an actual case see: COM-
MUNISM ACROSS THE COUNTER, by Bernard Fielding,
Plain Talk, January, 1947, p. 19.

21

Communist Seizure of Union Offices

WHILE union meetings are being taken over,
a quiet campaign is being organized against
those shop stewards and committeemen of key
crafts or units, who refuse to accept advice and
directions of the Communists. The plan is to take
from them their union positions, thereby giving the
Red group greater strategic power. This is usually
done by seeking to prove that the official is ineffec-
tive in processing grievances. To do this, the Com-
munist presents a complaint which has no solid
foundation. He insists that it be carried through all
the steps of the grievance procedure. When it fails,
as it must, he is vocal in his criticism of the way it
was handled. He joins with other workers who may
have lost grievances, and hints that the steward
is not a fighter, or that he sold out to the employer.
Sooner or later, these tactics get on the nerves of the
steward and he challenges the complainant to try
to do better himself. The Communist is "invited"
to go to the foreman with the steward to present his
own case. But this time he has a fool-proof grievance
which he has been saving for the occasion. He
wins and thus builds up his prestige among the
workers.

Often one such display is sufficient to unseat a
shop steward. If he still holds on, the Communist
insists upon being present for future grievance
discussions. This is a trap which will help to oust
the steward no matter how he answers. If he agrees,
solid complaints are taken up and usually won.
This means further prestige for the Communist. If
the steward refuses to accede, he is given weak
grievances which he loses. Immediately the rumors
are renewed and intensified. The chances are that
at the next departmental meeting, the Communist
will take over as steward. If the plant is large and
members do not know one another, Communists
will pack the meeting just to be certain.

With the groundwork laid, concentration shifts
to the annual election of local officers. Here the
tactics are repeated. The opposition is goaded into

22

sponsoring some impossible demands, in order to
outbid the Communists. They are often maneuvered
into supporting poorly qualified candidates from
minority groups, merely as an evidence of tolerance
and sincerity. In the meantime, the Communists
are spreading lying rumors about the officers.
Simultaneously, they cultivate racial, religious, and
national groups. Factions within the opposition are
promoted, so that its vote will be scattered. Under
these conditions, the compact, solid minority usually
rides through without trouble.

Once consolidated into power, the Communists
hang on by ruthless and dictatorial methods. If
possible, the vocal and consistent opposition is ex-
pelled on trumped-up charges. Elections are
fraudulent in the extreme. Many jobs are filled at
union meetings which are closely controlled. Mem-
bership cards are often distributed to outsiders from
other Communist controlled unions, so that they
can vote in meetings and at elections. Ballot boxes
are stolen or stuffed. As a result, the opposition
often gives up and a Communist dictatorship is
fastened upon the Local. The membership becomes
apathetic, but it is constantly being exploited into
hatred of the employer and disruptive tactics. Pro-
duction and morale suffer, and costs mount.*

The Employer Takes Action

UNTIL RECENTLY, it has been widely held
that the employer is helpless in such a situ-
ation.** Yet, granted that the Wagner Act forbids
him to interfere with the organization of his em-
ployees, the employer is not completely powerless.

*HOW TO SPOT A COMMUNIST, by Karl Baarslag,
The American Legion Magazine, January 1947, p. 9. WILL
THE CIO SHAKE THE COMMUNIST LOOSE? Joseph
and Stewart Alsop, Saturday Evening Post, February 22
and March 1, 1947. HOW TO SPOT A COMMUNIST,
Leo Cherne, Look, March 4, 1947. These articles are
especially useful to the anti-Communist employee and labor
leader.

** Communists in the labor movement have been aided
and abetted by the Communist influences within the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board from time to time.

* 23

s

Such a feeling of pessimism is extreme. Present
interpretations of the Wagner Act permit consider-
able freedom of speech by the employer .* Further-
more, although an employer may not intervene in
union politics he can at least abstain from actions
which aid the Communists.

This negative comfort is more substantial than
it seems at first glance. In Communist situations
it can be taken for granted that the workers them-
selves will form an opposition group. If the Inter-
national is clean, it will normally be most anxious
to remove a disruptive faction from its midst.
Where the employer is wise enough not to interfere
with such struggles, the anti-Communist group will
often be successful. By contrast, it is not uncommon
that industrial relations executives react in blind
panic against all union demands by a Communist-
controlled Local. This suits the Communists per-
fectly, since they can rally middle-of-the-roaders
against the employer and divert attention from the
factional struggle against them. An anti-Communist
union group cannot successfully argue the union's
cause with the employers and fight the Com-
munists within the union simultaneously.

As a first step in the counterattack, industrial
relations directors should familiarize themselves
with the Communist problem nationally and locally,
as indicated earlier. Then it is important that such
executives consult among themselves locally and
within each industry where a Communist problem
is indicated. The Communists themselves are or-
ganized along such lines, and it would be a mistake
if the employers were divided and defeated singly.
In such meetings, much can be learned of Com-
munist tactics in making and administering union
contracts. Naturally information gained from such
sources must be used with caution until each indi-
vidual has gained much experience. Many executives
still do not distinguish hard-bargaining and sincere

*The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals (Dec. S, 1946),
held that the employer has the right to indicate his prefer-
ence and opinion on labor union matters and even to en-
deavor to persuade his employees, provided such ^suasion
does not take the form of coercion. (NLRB v. KOPMAN
WORACEK SHOE MFG. CO.)

24 *

union officials, or even trouble makers, from actual
Communists. But experience will indicate which
individuals at such a meeting, or which of his own
company personnel, are best-informed and most
competent in making such distinctions and in the
handling of this problem.

At the beginning, at least, it may be desirable to
call in outside consultants who are expert in handling
Communism in the labor movement. Unfortunately
thus far, none of the national services which are
offered to industrial relations directors has concen-
trated upon this problem. Undoubtedly some indi-
vidual industrial relations consultants are familiar
with it. But the issue has been recognized too
recently to permit the building up of specialized
competent services in relation to it. At this writing,
industrial relations executives must do considerable
personal work to familiarize themselves with the
background and current trends of Communism in
labor unions.

Keeping Out a Communist Union

IF A PLANT is unorganized, the executive who
understands how to handle the problem should
use every legal means to keep out a Communist-
controlled union. Under present rulings, it is per-
mitted for an employer to give out this type of
information to his workers. Such an action should
be taken, however, only when Communist control
is reasonably proved. False use of such charges as
an anti-union device actually strengthens the Reds.
Furthermore, it is likely to boomerang against the
employer when subsequently he may be faced with

the real thing.

In a situation of this type, the first step is to
consult various listings to find the political connec-
tions of the petitioning International Union.* The
next step is to document the charges made against

♦ For listings, consult THE COMMUNIST IN LABOR
RELATIONS TODAY (Research Institute of America,
1946V THE COMMUNIST FIFTH COLUMN (Chicago
Journal o7 Commerce, 1946); COMMUNIST POWER W
INDUSTRY (Chicago Journal of Commerce, 1947).

* 25

the union. Often considerable material about its
officers can be found in the reports of the House
Committee on Un-American Activities. Records of
the unions' conventions and material from the union
paper may show a consistent following of the Com-
munist line. It would be well to have such informa-
tion prepared by, or at least checked by an expert,
so no inaccuracies can creep in. As a further point,
it must be remembered that to charge an individual
with being a Communist or of harboring Com-
munist sympathies constitutes libel per se in several
jurisdictions. Evidence of Communist affiliation
which is admissible in court and sufficient to prove
such affiliation may be difficult to secure. The pres-
ent "line" calls for Communist labor officials to go
underground and not to admit their affiliations.
Hence for individuals, the most that can normally
be proved is that they are consorters with Com-
munists and pro-Communists in their views. This,
however, is sufficient to show the danger involved
in their control of a Local.

The employer can then show the workers that
Communism is un-American. He can do this either
directly in his own publications or, preferably, by
distributing literature prepared by outside groups.
(See bibliography). He will also be able to prove
that Communists do not seek to improve conditions,
nor are their first thoughts the interests of the
workers. The employees can be shown that they will
be involved in politically directed strikes. Their
union funds will be siphoned off to support various
Communist front organizations. Their energies will
be absorbed by constant bickering and factional
disputes. Such internal union disputes are making
almost daily headlines in the nation's press. Photo-
stats of these articles or their headlines can be
used quite effectively.*

If the employer publishes such statements, he
must make it very clear that he is not using this as
a form of threat or coercion, or to interfere in any
way with the freedom of choice by his workers. The

* An outstanding illustration of an expose" was the series
of sixty articles by John Sentinel in the Milwaukee Sentinel,
Sept. 23-Nov, 21, 1946.

law guarantees to them complete freedom in making
their own decisions in this matter. He is speaking
for their interests in issuing this appeal. He will
frankly admit that he does not like to deal with
people whose loyalty is to a foreign power. But
this is the workers' decision, and they must consider
their own interests. (All of this shows the necessity
of amending the Wagner Act so as to allow em-
ployers full freedom of speech.)

It is likely that if a plant is being organized for
the first time, several rival unions will be competing
for the votes of the workers. It is not at all im-
probable that such an appeal by the employer will
be further documented and supported by all rivals
of the Communist-controlled union. This will
naturally strengthen the employer's case.

Working With a Communist Union

IF A Communist-controlled Local is already in
a plant, the tactics indicated above should not
be used. Under these conditions, any attack is
viewed by the workers as an attempt to weaken
their union. The result would be to solidify all fac-
tions against the employer.* The most that can be
done in the way of passing out information is in
the treatment of individual issues. Thus, an em-
ployer may explain at length the reasons for the
position he has taken in collective bargaining. He
should do this if he knows that a fair settlement of
a problem is being impeded for political reasons.
But in regard to the Communist issue in his Local,
silence is normally the better rule. If the company
paper normally discusses world and domestic
events, relevant general material on the subject
would be in order. Thus, it may be helpful to discuss
Communist tyranny in Yugoslavia or Poland, or
the harsh peace treaties which were imposed upon
Italy and other nations at Soviet instigation. But
the application of such material to local conditions

*An illustration of this point, in 1947, employer and
newspaper attacks upon a proven Communist-controlled
Local, weakened by a record-breaking strike, were not suc-
cessful in persuading the majority of the workers to change
affiliation to an independent union.

26

* 27

had best be left to the good judgment of the workers
themselves. It might also be possible to mail anti-
Communist literature, such as that listed in the
bibliography, to the homes of potential leaders of
an opposition.

Of course, if some outside group with no economic
interest in the company is attacking Communism,
this is a piece of good fortune for the employer.*
Thus, for example, veterans and church groups have
often been concerned with the problem. Activities
of this sort cannot be construed as attacks upon
unionism. This will be the more constructive if the
employer does not attempt to intervene and direct
the crusade to his own problem. Such intervention
might be resented. He can be well satisfied if the
general atmosphere is hostile to Communism. The
workers can then take the matter into their own
hands in dealing with their union.

Non-interference with union matters does not
mean that an employer must be passive in the
situation. His first duty is to obtain an informed
insight into conditions in the Local. He should try
to discover and classify the leaders in the Com-
munist faction. Some of these he will consider as
professed Communists, while others will be labeled
as opportunists or dupes. He will then catalogue
other union leaders in regard to their attitudes and
effectiveness. Some may be neutral in the struggle
between factions, interested only in a good Local.
Others may be strongly anti-Communist and ready
to fight the group in control. Still others may be
opposed to Communism, but unwilling to fight, or
unconvinced that the leadership is really controlled
by Reds. Information of this type can be quite
useful in the light of subsequent recommendations.

The Contract With a Red Local

IN NEGOTIATING a contract with a Com-
munist-controlled Local, an employer must go
in with his eyes open. He is dealing with persons

* E.g. Exposing the Red Threat to Free Enterprise and
Individual Liberty, by Frederick Woltman, New York:
World-Telegram, 1947.

who are not sincere. They will lie and distort what
he says.* They will make impossible demands for
the sake of stirring up trouble. They will encumber
the contract with ambiguous trick phrases and
booby-trap clauses to cause subsequent trouble.
Hence the employer must be alert and prepared to
meet unscrupulous opposition. But he is by no
means helpless. Communists cannot ordinarily call
a strike as a matter of whim. They must have some
appearance of a case to present to the workers.
And, if the employer does not let himself become
panicked into rash statements or thoughtless action,
the Communists may not succeed in causing trouble
at this juncture of the proceedings.

As a matter of general attitude in such negotia-
tions, the employer must avoid two extremes. First,
he should beware of being extremely generous, in
the hope of appeasing or buying off the opposition.
Such tactics are fatal. The employer will not be
thanked for his kindness. On the contrary, he will
be confronted with new demands which he may find
very hard to meet. In this connection it may be well
to note the case of a firm which had an unauthor-
ized strike called by a Communist faction. Not all
the workers went out on strike. The company
unwisely offered to pay wages to the strikers for
time not worked, and triple wages to those who
remained on the job. The result, as could be guessed,
was a bitter attack on the firm by the Communist
leaders with an unfair labor practice charge placed
in the hands of the State labor relations board.

Secondly, equally dangerous for an employer, is
the adoption of the fatalistic attitude that he will
get a strike anyway, so he had better not make any
concessions at all. Such an approach is a guarantee
that he will get his strike, with all the workers
solidly united behind the Communist leaders. The
employer would be wiser to be prepared to accept
the national pattern in economic clauses, if his
competitive position will permit it. Naturally, as a
matter of sound collective bargaining tactics, he
will not make all his concessions in his first offer.

* If this is doubted, see instructions of Lenin and the
Comintern on inside cover of this report.

28

* 29

If he is to grant benefits to the workers, he should
be ready to ask for guarantees of production in-
creases which will help to offset increased costs. His
counter-demands will run largely in terms of security
against wildcat strikes, "quickies," and other un-
authorized stoppages of production. He can rightly
demand no strikes for the duration of the agreement.
Furthermore there should be definite penalties
against individuals and against the union for viola-
tions of the agreement.

Another general point of value is the recording
of all discussions, with the minutes of the meeting
signed by both sides. Language of the contract
should be clear and unequivocal, with a minimum
leeway left for good faith or subsequent interpreta-
tion. It is well to have experienced talent available
for the writing of terms. At the same time, the scope
of legal advice should be clearly denned. It must
not be forgotten that industrial relations directors
have to carry out the contract on the working level.
In drawing the contract, they should be given a
position at least coordinate with, and preferably
superior to, legal counsel. The legal mind is not
always trained for the give and take of collective
bargaining discussions. Legal talent is best employed
for accuracy of phrasing of clauses drawn up by
production and industrial relations executives.

Details of the Contract

THE MOST important details in a contract
with a Communist-controlled union concern
management and union security. Management
should be extremely careful in granting any con-
cessions which impede any of its prerogatives. Par-
ticular care should be exercised in drawing up the
scope of the arbitration clause. Arbitration under
a contract is frequently desirable. It provides im-
partial determination of disputes in regard to appli-
cation and interpretation of a contract. If the
contract is carefully and accurately drawn, arbitra-
tion will prevent the Communists from effectively

30

sabotaging it. Even if they engineer disputes, they
will lose them when brought before an impartial
party. Thus the onus for the trouble is shifted from
the employer to the Local leaders. Yet it would be
dangerous to entrust to an arbitrator functions
which properly belong to management. Certainly a
clause which permits arbitration of any dispute
between the union and the company is extreme.
Management's right to change the scope of its
operations, to promote workers to executive posi-
tions, to transfer workers, to alter shifts, and the
like, should in principle be non-arbitrable. Individual
discharges, layoffs, upgrading within the unit of
representation, and such may be arbitrable as to
fact and within the scope of the contract.

With a Communist-controlled Local, it is a most
dangerous principle to admit any action which in-
volves a review of managerial decisions. As noted
earlier, many employers favor some type of labor-
management cooperation. With the Communists,
however, these clauses would be used to enforce
labor dictation to management in the latter's field.
Communist Locals are often willing to sacrifice
economic gains in order to drive a wedge into the
field of management prerogatives and responsi-
bilities.

Likewise an employer should be most careful in
granting extreme forms of union security when his
Local is Communist-dominated. The leaders would
make almost any concession to gain a closed shop,
a union shop, or maintenance of membership. Such
a clause would be invaluable to them in exercising
dictatorship over their members. Trumped-up ex-
pulsions would give them an opportunity for de-
manding the discharge of their opponents. If some
form of security clause already exists or must be
given, it is necessary to insist upon impartial review
of all union expulsions, should discharges be in-
volved. The best way is to give union members
the same right to appeal discharge cases under union
security clauses as they have in other discharge
cases. The impartial chairman would have the right
and duty to pass upon the adequacy of the trial
given to the member in question.

* 31

/

Plant Discipline

THE CONTRACT with a Communist-con-
trolled Local should be clear and strict in
defining matters of plant discipline. Naturally Com-
munists will try to do as much political work as
possible during working hours and while on the
job. Furthermore, they will be away from the plant
frequently for political reasons. To prevent this, it
is necessary to have a graduated series of penalties
for unexcused absences. These can range from a
light suspension for a first offense to discharge for
a third offense within a reasonable period of time.
Such rules are within management's prerogatives
and need not be part of the contract The contract
should specify, however, the rights of shop stewards
and committeemen to be off the job, with permission
and only to settle grievances. The total amount of
time permitted should be specified but flexible in
its use, so that real grievances can be processed.
However, such allowances should be definitely tied
up to the settling of grievances, and not available as
an excuse for political meddling. Normally shop
stewards should be confined to their department,
except when their presence is required to settle a
grievance on a higher level. There is no objection to
the company's paying, at least in part, for time
used to settle grievances, providing such a privilege
is not abused. The burden of payment should be
on the company or the union. If it must be borne
by the individual shop steward, the better men will
not accept the position and it will fall to the ever-
seeking Communists by default.

The company should be reasonable in granting
leaves of absence to employees upon union request,
but strict in confining them to union matters only.
Such leaves are customary for full-time officers.
Temporary leaves should be granted for attendance
at union conventions and other large-scale meetings.
Naturally such leaves are without pay. Full-time
officers in mass production unions are not normally
permitted to enter the plant and roam at will. They
are given every reasonable facility to meet with
Industrial relations executives. But their contacts

32 *

with union members should be after working hours.
Contract clauses should be sought which will
provide strict discipline for violations of the agree-
ment. Individuals responsible for unauthorized
stoppages or slow-downs should be subject to sus-
pension for a first offense, and expulsion for a
second. If an unauthorized strike which ties up the
entire plant is sanctioned by the Local officers or
connived in by them, the contract might be abro-
gated and subject to renegotiation.

Caution for the Future

A NY NEGOTIATIONS with a Communist-
i\ controlled group should be undertaken with
an eye to the future. It is not the reasonableness of
the proposition in itself which should be determin-
ing, but rather the possible use which the faction
in control will make of it, Grants which may be
perfectly reasonable in other circumstances may be
dangerous under these conditions. Furthermore, in
bargaining with such a group, the employer should
make crystal-clear the tie-ins which surround a pro-
posal or offer. If he concedes an economic point to
avoid an overly strict union security clause, he may
find the rejected clause reopened later in the negoti-
ations. Or the Communists may engineer rank-and-
file rejection of the entire contract. Their aim is
to explore the entire field of labor-management re-
lations and to obtain quickly the maximum employer
concessions. These they accept only conditionally.
They then use these grants as a foundation for
further demands. Unless it is certain that a bar-
gaining committee can and will deliver acceptance
of the contract, the conditional nature of the con-
cessions must be insisted upon again and again.

This picture of vicious collective bargaining,
without mutual trust, is indeed somber. It would be
tragic if such a spirit were to pervade all negotia-
tions between unions and employers. Certainly the
suggestions given here are not meant to apply where
decent elements have secured control of a Local.
But the question arises: what if their control is

* 33

insecure? Here the employer must prudently choose
between two alternatives. On the one hand, if the
decent elements can get a fair contract, with gen-
erous concessions, it will strengthen their hand in
the factional struggle. On the other hand, if they
lose control, such a contract might be badly abused.
The employer has to judge probabilities and make
a prudent decision. Possibly generous economic con-
cessions, plus a strong stand on management pre-
rogatives and against excessive union security would
be the best general answer in most cases.

Concurrent with a fair but strict policy in negoti-
ations should be constant efforts to build up good
will among the workers. If the employer removes
real causes of grievances, has well-trained super-
visory personnel, and a reasonable attitude towards
the workers, Communist propaganda against him
will eventually boomerang. The union members
will become dissatisfied with their leaders, and may
ultimately revolt against them. They will realize
that the employer is trying to do the right thing,
and that their own leaders are hindering the process.

Working Under the Contract

jNCE A CONTRACT is signed with a union,
there arises the problem of day-by-day
application of this document to the problems in the
plant. This is a new phase of contact with the
union. Whatever troubles may have arisen during
negotiations should, if possible, be a closed book.
The signed agreement is the law which should gov-
ern labor-management relations during the life of
the contract. In theory, at least, both sides should
live up to the terms agreed upon, no matter how
good or bad they consider them to be. In practice,
a Communist-controlled Local is likely to bring up
again and again points which it bargained away in
negotiations. The employer must be prepared for
this and ready to insist upon a scrupulous observ-
ance of the agreement. Here is where adequate and
impartial arbitration within the contract may prove
its worth.

34 *

The most important phase of the daily applica-
tion of the contract is the machinery for handling
grievances. The employer must expect grievances
no matter how carefully he may strive to be fair to
his workers. The sheer size of many modern plants
makes some friction and misunderstanding inevi-
table. This fact should be explained to foremen and
other supervisory officials. Their normal reaction is
to regard complaints as reflections upon their own
ability. Accordingly, they tend to fight complainants
in a spirit of resentment. With careful training, how-
ever, they can be made to realize that top manage-
ment expects a certain number of grievances as a
routine feature of operations. It is only when the
number of complaints is unusually large or small
that a problem may exist.

Under normal grievance procedure, the settling
of complaints tends to remove irritations and im-
prove morale. Production is benefited by an efficient
system for handling grievances. But when there
are sharp deviations from average results in a given
department, the industrial relations office faces a
difficulty. If complaints are below average, this
may indicate exceptional tact and ability on the
part of the foreman. On the other hand, it may
spring from poor work on the part of the union
shop steward. Paradoxically, such a situation is
not to an employer's advantage. If real grievances
are not presented and quickly solved, morale suf-
fers. A foreman who browbeats a timid shop stew-
ard is following a short-sighted policy. Also, a sub-
normal amount of grievances can arise where a
foreman is weak and yielding in applying estab-
lished company policy. Such a situation means
trouble, since concessions which deviate from the
contract create annoying precedents which will be
used by an alert Local. Uniform interpretation of
the contract is essential for harmonious industrial
relations.

Where grievances in a department tend con-
sistently to exceed the average, a different set of
problems arises. Such a situation could be caused
by a foreman who is either excessively harsh or
unduly fearful. The one tends to belittle grievances

* 35

and must be forced into acting upon them. The
other is afraid to make mistakes and hence tries
to pass all but the simplest problems to higher
levels. Both these types are undesirable, the for-
mer because he damages morale and the latter
because he tends to clog up the grievance machinery.
On the other hand, the fault may lie with the
union shop steward. He may be aggressive or
quarrelsome by nature, or he may be following
Communist tactics. Earlier we noted how Com-
munists try to capitalize upon the grievance ma-
chinery to win a following. Here is a real test of
the skill possessed by industrial relations executives.

Communists and
the Grievance Procedure

WHERE an abnormal grievance situation
exists, and the fault cannot properly be laid
at the door of the foreman, a careful diagnosis
will reveal how to catalogue the shop steward who
is provoking trouble. The isolated rebel and the
malcontent are usually easy to spot. Neither has
close relationship with the Communist faction and
they are generally independent in union politics.
The Communists may try to use them in order
to capture their following, but the relationship
tends to be unstable at best. Even when they
may work with Communists for a while, they do not
follow Communist ideology nor do they espouse
their political ends. Such individuals, while a
problem, do not work in an organized and planned
manner to bedevil the employer. Good foremanship
and sound industrial relations normally tend to
eliminate this type. The men soon realize that
such troublemakers do their cause more harm than
good.

The situation is altered where grievances are
being manufactured for political and factional pur-
poses. Even here normal grievance policy must
prevail, but it must be applied with special in-
telligence and discretion. Normal policy may be
denned as an eager willingness to settle at the

36 *

first step all reasonable grievances. Such a policy
would discourage, through courteous explanation,
carrying completely unreasonable complaints to
higher steps. The good foreman seeks to develop
such an understanding with the shop steward that
each can completely trust the other's word and
sound judgment. Under such conditions, a fore-
man may be willing frequently to stretch a point
in favor of the shop steward, since he realizes that
his good will is not likely to be abused. Where
these conditions obtain, settlement at the lowest
level is the normal result,

As has been said even with a Communist shop
steward, the basic elements of normal procedure
must still be retained. Just grievances should be
settled expeditiously. The difficulty arises, however,
through the lack of mutual trust between the
shop steward and the foreman. The foreman un-
der such circumstances cannot ordinarily trust
either the word or the judgment of the steward. He
may legitimately suspect ulterior designs and well-
concealed traps. As a result, he is usually forced to
perform as exhaustive an investigation as is per-
mitted within the time limit set by the agreement.
Where there is reasonable doubt, he normally
refers grievances to higher levels, since any con-
cession by one foreman will be used as a plant-wide
precedent. For the same reason he cannot stretch a
point or grant the benefit of the doubt to the shop
steward. To preserve morale, he is on the alert
for direct, on-the-spot settlements cf problems with
the individual worker, avoiding the grievance ma-
chinery where possible. He may find the workers
themselves anxious to by-pass the normal processes,
since they realize that their real complaints are
.thrown into the same hopper with manufactured
political grievances. If identical policy is fol-
lowed towards all employees and no discrimination
tolerated, political grievances often can be left
to die with the arbitrator and real problems
settled directly. Formal complaints must, under
ruling of the National Labor Relations Board, be
handled in the presence of the union representa-
tive, but informal settlements can be made and in

* 37

most instances lead to smooth relationships even
under a Communist shop steward.

Where a Communist is trying to win the post of
shop steward, the foreman must avoid the trap
described earlier. He should never permit the
Communist as an individual to bring complaints
to him, but should insist upon dealing with the
legitimate shop steward. In dealing with the latter,
he must be fair and even generous, as was de-
scribed in connection with normal grievance policy.
If the foreman knows that the steward is being
badgered by a Communist into submitting poor
grievances, he should cooperate with the steward
by explaining, in the presence of the complaining
employee if necessary, why the grievance cannot
be settled in his favor. Such a careful explanation
can serve to discredit the Communist and shift the
burden of rejection from the shoulders of the
decent and honest shop steward.

The effect of such a policy should be great. It
should serve to educate the rank and file members
on the basic elements of a fair labor policy. They
will realize that the aggressive, belligerent tactics
of the Communist do not produce lasting results.
Rather they will note that such an approach tends
mostly to slow down and interfere with legitimate
bargaining. It will soon be evident to them that
decent union stewards are producing better results
because of their policy of honesty and mutual
trust. The result will be a definite if gradual swing
in favor of such competent and successful officials.
Since grievances are to a union what patronage
is to a political machine, it will not be long be-
fore the Communists are bereft of power.

The Industrial Relations Director

THE PROBLEM of applying the contract so
as to minimize Communist difficulties pro-
vides real obstacles for the industrial relations
executive. That he may do this well, top manage-
ment must give him adequate authority to act and
repose confidence in his judgment. If they cannot
do this, he should be replaced.

38 *

The first step in the industrial relations de-
partment is to explain the contract thoroughly and
carefully to the entire supervisory personnel. A
good practice is to mimeograph a detailed explana-
tion of each clause and to give the foremen a bound
copy. Pertinent provisions of the Wagner Act and
other applicable state and federal laws can be
included in this volume. Meetings should be held to
supplement written explanation by oral presenta-
tion, and to encourage the asking of questions. The
general outlines of the Communist problem should
also be presented in these meetings.

Foremen should be instructed to bring doubtful
situations to the industrial relations department.
They should regularly report on their personal
relations with shop stewards. Any traces of fac-
tionalism or efforts at political activity within de-
partments should be reported at once. This will
give the industrial relations director a chance to
review the situation and to give more detailed ad-
vice to the foreman in question. In this way, fore-
men will not become unconscious accessories to the
Communists' plans to take over shop steward
positions. Foremen should cooperate likewise with
the existing non-Communist stewards and not per-
mit outside interference from agitators. It must be
remembered that the best place to choke off Com-
munist-inspired grievances is at the first step.

If the shop steward of a department is a Com-
munist, it is likely that the burden of his activity
will be shifted to higher grievance steps. He will
present so many nuisance grievances that refusals
and appeals will be normal procedure. At the higher
level, the industrial relations executive will be
meeting with the union grievance committee or
business agent. The executive's problem is to pre-
vent the Communists from capitalizing upon the
situation for political purposes. He knows that he
must grant reasonable grievances at this step, or
lose them at a higher step. But with care, he can
see that Communists do not get too much credit for
winning good cases. Thus, in most situations a
grievance committee is not politically uniform.
Some members at least will be non-Communist.

* 39

Their word and judgment can be trusted. If a case,
on the surface, looks good to the industrial rela-
tions director, he can direct the conversation to a
decent union official, asking for his comment or
opinion. When the latter favors the granting of the
grievance, the executive can answer "yes," thus
disposing of the case. On the other hand, when
Communist- inspired and unreasonable grievances
come up, they should be given the burden of
defending them. When the answer from manage-
ment is "no," they bear the onus of the defeat.
Such methods will cause Communist tactics to
boomerang, and build up the prestige of the Amer-
ican-minded union officials.

The industrial relations director should expect
personal insult and vituperation from Communists
on grievance committees. Under such attacks, he
should remain completely calm and retain absolute
self-control. Anger clouds sound judgment, and
leads to hasty and ill-considered decisions. If the
executive keeps calm, even though he may appear
to be affected, he will frequently find that the Com-
munists have baited themselves into frenzied loss of
control, He can then call the meeting sharply to
order and bring them back to the business at hand.
Such tactics will hurt their prestige and often
goad them into compromising revelations.

The executive can keep control of meetings only
if he has effective power to make decisions. He
cannot be expected to produce results if he is
nothing more than an "office boy" who must re-
port above for every decision. On the other hand,
he has nothing to gain by pretending to have ab-
solute power. Difficult problems will require delay
and consultation, and the wise executive will state
the situation frankly.

At times it is possible to handle "hot" or "loaded"
grievances at a still higher level, if the industrial
relations director feels that the complaint is sound,
but has been presented at the meeting with the
grievance committee primarily for political pur-
poses. Thus, he can defer a favorable decision until
after the meeting when the atmosphere is less
charged. This may be at the arbitration level, or

it may be in direct dealings with Local or Inter-
national union officials. Such may be advisable even
if the officials in question are Communists. The
executive thus demonstrates his fairness, once he
sees the facts, and at the same time prevents the
grievance meeting from being used for political
purposes. Furthermore, if management loses a fair
share of arbitration cases, it is spared the necessity
of constantly changing arbitrators. Arbitrators who
predominantly rule for one side will be accused
of bias, even though in fact they were completely
objective and used sound judgment.

In all the situations outlined here, it must be
noted that the grievances themselves must be de-
cided upon their merits. It would be unjust, and
tactically dangerous, to treat complaints on the
basis of the politics of the official who presents
them. But the manner in which they are handled
can have deep political implications. The unwary
executive will find himself maneuvered into giving
support to a Communist faction. If he uses dis-
crimination and intelligence, however, he will outwit
the disruptive elements within the union.

Dealing with Union Officials

THE REFLECTIONS on contacts with shop
stewards lead naturally to the broader subject
of relations with union officials. In this regard, an
employer faced with a Communist problem must
avoid two mistakes above all. The first is the
development of a general resentment against all
union officials because of his sour experiences with
the Communists. Such a reaction tends to strengthen
the hands of the radical group, since the moderates
are thrown in with them whether they like it or
not. A much more sensible policy is to treat each
official on his own merits. If his character and ac-
tions are such as to merit confidence and trust, he
should be handled accordingly. The effect of such
discrimination is to strengthen the hands of the
anti-Communist faction. They do not want special
favors from the employer; indeed, the open grant-

40

41

ing of such favors would boomerang into charges
that they were "Company men." But at the same
time they cannot carry on a two-front strategy,
caught between the company and the Reds at the

same time.

A second error to be avoided is the identifying
of a fair union official with a docile union officer.
The adjectives are by no means synonymous.
Thus, some industrial relations executives com-
plain when a non-Communist official proves to be
an aggressive bargainer at the conference table.
Some have even been quoted as saying that
they would prefer to deal with a Communist
rather than with such an officer. It is true that at
times individual Communists may be more
pleasant personalities than occasional opponents.
Yet, it must be remembered that Communist con-
trol' means an organized and continual assault upon
employers' rights. Communists set up standards
which at times their opponents must imitate
through the sheer necessity of self-preservation
within the union's political structure. Often the
employer himself is at fault through the failure to
grant opportune and face-saving concessions to
opponents of the Communist faction. It is not
unheard-of that employers will win small battles
at the conference table, costing American-minded
officials their union jobs, and then lose major wars
when their radical successors give employers a
taste of real demands.

Even under the Wagner Act, the employer often
has real, if thoroughly unconscious, influence
in naming of union officers. Small but gracious
concessions, frequent consultations, and recogni-
tion can often build up the stature of a union
official. Likewise, the thoughtless by-passing of the
same man, the announcement of concessions
through the plant bulletin board rather than
through the union paper, and similar oversights can
lower his prestige to an alarming degree. The
NLRB does not allow direct intervention in union
affairs. But if the employer is not free to pick the
officers he likes, the least he can do is abstain
from actions which hurt them. He does not need to

42 *

embarrass and punish the decent element just to
prove that he is impartial.*

A word might be said about direct dealings with
union officials in an informal manner. It is occa-
sionally possible to sit down to dinner with an
international officer, the local president or business
agent. Such informal meetings can be productive of
real candor. Both sides can talk freely without
worrying about a reaction from those to whom
they must report. Such conferences need not have
the slightest element of the dishonest about them.
In fact, if such should be even hinted, the em-
ployer should drop them at once, and this from a
purely selfish point of view, as well as from an
ethical consideration. An official who would betray
the men who elected him would betray the executive
who confided in him. The only reason for off-the-
record meetings is that collective bargaining, like
the fashioning of peace treaties, requires a certain
public attitude that does not make compromise and
adjustment easy. Privately, an executive may ad-
mit that a contract clause is too severe; publicly, he
may feel compelled to defend it. The same might
be true of the local president in regard to certain
demands made by the union.

Where collective bargaining is not new, in-
formal meetings as described are frequent enough
to be commonplace. Thus, in a by no means hy-
pothetical case, an international officer used to
have dinner weekly with an industrial relations
executive. They would go over outstanding prob-
lems and grievances. But each kept his freedom
of action. The employer's representative was un-
able to grant certain concessions strongly desired
by the union official. The latter in turn did not
hesitate to call strikes when he felt that the issues
warranted them. Consultation did not bring a
millennium. But it did narrow sharply the area of
conflict. Furthermore, in this particular case, it

* It is probable that the 80th Congress will modify the
Wagner Act so that employers can work more effectively,
and without fear of law violation, with American-minded
employees in opposing Communists within the labor move-
ment.

43

served to hinder effectively the workings of a
highly skilled Communist faction operating in the
plant under discussion. This union official was de-
cent, but not docile. He worked hard and intelli-
gently for his men, but he was experienced and
reasonable enough to see the employer's problems
as well. Such a man is far better, even from the
employer's viewpoint, than a docile company tool
who will soon be outmaneuvered and ousted by his
own people or by the Communists.

A Summary

TO HANDLE Communism in labor relations,
certain steps are essential. They may be
briefly recapitulated here.

1) The employer must realize that this is a
specialized and serious problem. He must be pre-
pared to recognize with accuracy the Communist
line and tactics. He must consult with others so as
to facilitate the spotting of Communists in action.

2} If he has no union, he should use every
legitimate step to keep a Communist-controlled
group from taking over his plant.

3) Where he faces the problem of Communism
within a local, he should recognize this fact in con-
tract negotiations. If Communists are not already
in power, inept handling of negotiations might bring
them in. Should they be in power, the contract
must be drawn with great exactness. As little as
possible should be left to good will or the applica-
tion of common sense. Management prerogative and
arbitration provisions must be tight and clear.

4^ The problem of Communism will affect
grievance procedure. Ordinarily grievances should
be handled in an atmosphere of generosity and
trust. With Communists, such an attitude would be
abused. Careful and exhaustive investigation to
avoid fraud and trickery is called for.

5} When the employer is confronted with
American-minded union officials, he should treat

44

them with friendliness and trust. They should not
be compelled to fight both him and the Communists,
Decent officials are not of necessity docile or pliant
to every company wish.

The Worker Fights Communism

THUS FAR, the consideration has been ex-
clusively in terms of the employer's interest
in fighting Communism. It has been mentioned in-
cidentally that workers too are in the struggle.

Actually such a presentation is so specialized as
to be almost misleading. The real struggle against
the Reds in labor must be carried out by the union
members themselves. As a rule, the best the em-
ployer can do is to protect his own interests and
try not to interfere with the decent element in the
union. Such action by the employer is important,
but it would not be very effective if the workers
themselves were not vitally interested and active.

Workers who fight Communism are usually in-
fluenced by one or more of three motives: patriot-
ism, religion or desire for sound unionism. Many
realize that the Communist is essentially a foreign
agent. Whether he realizes it or not, he takes or-
ders from New York which are directed by Moscow
through Paris. Non-Communists know that his
power in labor will be used against the best in-
terests of the country; Others may be impressed
by the low-level ethics and the anti-religious nature
of Communism. Whatever be their faith, they know
that the totalitarian State does not leave the con-
science free. In this regard, members of minority
groups especially cultivated by the Communists
often become their most aggressive opponents, this
in order to save the good name of their group.
Finally, most union members soon discover that a
Communist cannot be a good union member. He
will invariably seek to use the union in the in-
terests of an outside political party. Furthermore,
his disruptive factional tactics hurt the legitimate
interests of labor.
The effectiveness of the opposition is not neces-

* 45

I

sarily proportional to the strength of motivation.
To fight Communists in labor, interest is not enough.
Interest must flame into zeal, and be tempered by
intelligence and experience. Communist control of
unions is achieved by political-machine tactics. It
can be countered only by a better machine which
organizes the majority against a skilled and un-
scrupulous minority. Accordingly, the best fighters
against Reds in labor are experienced unionists. In
this category would be included craftsmen, miners,
and railroad workers with a long history of union-
ism. As their allies they may have some proletarian
groups such as Socialists and Social Democrats,
and non-Stalinist Communist groups. The last-
named Communists may be as bad as their ene-
mies, from whom they do not differ in ideology, but
only in loyalty to the Soviet Union leadership. In
practice, they are rarely numerous enough to take
over a Local. Normally, they merely add experience
and militancy to the anti-Communist faction. In
union struggles, such experienced leaders contribute
organizing ability and generalship, although their
diverse ideologies may add confusion. Those who
have patriotic or religious motivation, but lack
experience, at first can offer only zeal and numbers,
the while acquiring experience.

There has been no mention of the employer's part
in promoting anti-Communist activity within the
union itself. The reason is simple: he has no part.
Much as he may be tempted to join in, he must
remain on the sidelines. Intervention on his part
would only damage the cause which he hopes will
win. Nothing is more fatal for a union group than
to be labeled "company tools." Of course the Com-
munists will use such ammunition anyway, but the
employer does not need to furnish them with it.
Two temptations in particular must be avoided.
The first is the providing of the anti-Communist
faction with funds. They will need money badly.
Literature must be paid for. Time will be lost from
work. It will be a hard struggle, but the employer
must not assist. Possibly the International may
help, or some other Local which has won its strug-
gle, or some patriotic or religious group. Outside

46 *

aid in a factional struggle is always dangerous, but
sometimes necessary. But when it comes from the
employer, it is fatal.

In the second place, the employer may not aid
through the relaxation of plant discipline. He can-
not openly countenance factional activity by anti-
Communist groups during working time. Well-
meaning individuals should be warned when an
infraction is noticed. Repeated offenses must be
punished by suspension or similar penalties. The
employer can take for granted that the Communists
will make complaints against such violations. If he
fails to act on such charges, he will label the oppo-
sition as company-dominated and probably face
Wagner Act charges. By taking the initiative him-
self in warning the opposing faction, he can avoid
such trouble. He is then in a much better position
rigidly to enforce similar rules against the Com-
munist group.

Tactics in the Struggle

THE WORKER fights Communism primarily
through building a better political machine
than does the Red faction. As an illustration of such
tactics, we may take the case of Local 23. Here a
Communist group gained power largely through
surprise at the previous election. However, they
were not given time to consolidate their strength.
Their opponent, a trained union leader, gathered
around him a small faction of loyal union members.
They met quietly in one another's houses, while
holding the Communists in check from meeting to
meeting, and worked out a slate for the next election.
Each member canvassed throughout the entire plant
and built up strength for a particular candidate, but
no indication was given that these candidates were
part of a unified slate. At the last minute, a merger
was effected and the strength controlled by each
member of the caucus was thrown to all the candi-
dates in the group. The Communists were caught
off guard and soundly defeated.

A situation such as the one just described will

* 47

not be repeated often. But it does teach certain
lessons which have universal application. The first
is that the issue of Communism was not raised in
the whole election campaign. Of course, the problem
of Communism versus sound unionism was the
cement which bound together the initial caucus.
But the men campaigned for support on the basis
of union issues and the ability of candidates they
had selected. This was not a negative approach; it
was a positive program. They did not seek merely
to displace Communists as such; they replaced
them with candidates who were better timber for
union officers. The result was that they won support
from all sides.

Union elections do not precisely parallel civic
elections. In the latter case, a sound attack upon
the "ins" often brings a large protest vote to the
polls. With labor, the attacking of officers as Com-
munists is more likely to produce confusion and
lethargy. The Communists themselves will not
normally admit the charge. They will smear and
discredit the opposition. The average worker be-
comes so puzzled that his reaction is: "A plague
on both your houses." Of course if, in an exceptional
case, it can be proved that most of the officers are
really Communists, such an attack will be effective.
But it is one thing to be certain of a fact, and
another and different thing to be prepared to prove
it in public controversy and to an untrained audi-
ence. Ordinarily Communist charges are best re-
served for the inner caucus and for word-of-mouth
reports spread through the plant by the anti-
Communist opposition.

The best political opposition to a Communist
group is a well-rounded, truly representative, and
able group of prospective officers on an election
slate. If each of these men has a sizable following,
he will be able to add it to the common pool on
election day. The campaign issues raised by such a
group should be both positive and negative. Posi-
tively, they should advocate measures which will
improve the well-being of the Local. These are
usually constructive, common-sense ideas which are
likely to prevail in collective bargaining. Negatively,

they should attack the Communist officers on union
rather than political issues. They will have ample
reasons to point to neglect of duty, misuse of funds,*
wasting of time in union meetings discussing purely
political problems, and related abuses. The Com-
munist issue as such should not be raised by the
group; rather as individuals they should circulate
such information by word of mouth.

A union slate which is likely to defeat a Com-
munist group of officers must be both competent and
representative of the membership. The old axiom
"You cannot beat somebody with nobody" is true
in union politics. The fact that a member is strongly
opposed to Communism is not in itself an indication
that he will make a successful union officer. Among
competent candidates, choices should be made with
a view to balanced representation. Departmental,
shift, racial, national, and religious factors are
normally considered in picking a good slate. In
principle, all major departments, all fully staffed
shifts, and each sizable minority group should have
a candidate on the ticket. This will prevent splinter
slates which divide the anti-Communist opposition
and permit the Communists to exercise the balance
of power. Every reasonable compromise should be
made in order to avoid the situation of too many
candidates for a given office. Communists try to
provoke such splits so that they can more easily
defeat a divided opposition.

Once a pro-American group of officers is elected,
they should contact similar groups in their union
and also non-Communist Locals of other unions in
their region. They can thus pool information on
Communist personnel and tactics. From others they
can receive advice on policies and programs. At
times such friendly neighbors can assist in passing
out literature, organizing demonstrations, and ex-
posing local Communist concentrations.

* Many millions of dollars have been drained from Com-
munist-controlled union treasuries for the support of their
political mass meetings and front organizations.

48

49

Consolidation of Power

i/^OMMUNISTS, once they have gained power,
^^l do not as a rule yield readily. When they are
ousted from office, they scheme to promote factions,
discredit the new officers, and try to return to power.
Hence alertness upon the part of the decent new
officers is vital. Being men of principle, they will
not use the Communist tactics of trying to expel
their opposition from the Local. On the other hand,
in attempting to be fair, they should not lean over
backwards and tolerate tactics which they would
not countenance from others. Open disruption in
union meetings, gross violations of plant discipline,
and departmental strife should not be defended or
condoned. Disruptive tactics should be met by ex-
pulsion after a fair trial. If the employer penalizes
a Communist for flagrant violations of plant rules,
the officers should not allow themselves to be pres-
sured into defending the culprit.

The new officers will meet their greatest problems
in handling grievance procedures and in running
union meetings. In regard to grievances, the Com-
munists will use the tactics noted earlier in the
attempt to undermine shop stewards. They will also
appeal hopeless cases in order to discredit the union
grievance committee, the business agents, and the
arbitration procedure. Against such tactics, the
officers should present a united front. Shop stewards
should reject obviously unsound and political com-
plaints. The business agent and the grievance com-
mittee should stand by the shop stewards. If some
of the stewards are Communist and do send poor
grievances to the higher steps, the poor ones should
in general be weeded out ruthlessly. Occasionally
some which are obviously weak might be presented,
with the results and the reasons for rejection written
up in the Local paper. The common sense of the
members will do the rest, and the whole proceeding
will serve to discredit Communist leadership and
tactics. But under no conditions should the Com-
munists be allowed to clog up the grievance ma-
chinery. Nor should they be permitted direct access

50 *

to management to present complaints, unless they
are entitled to do so because of a union office they
hold.

Union meetings should be run with the same care
and firmness. The officers should master parlia-
mentary procedure and not tolerate disruptive or
delaying tactics. Free and fair discussion of issues
must be encouraged, but the officers should be alert
to Communist attempts to prolong meetings or to
inject extraneous problems. In this regard, it would
be a fatal mistake to disband the caucus which
originally won the election. The caucus can ensure
attendance of meetings, enter into preliminary dis-
cussion of important points, and arrange disciplined
voting to table Communist-inspired nuisance or
political motions.

Building from the Bottom

THE PRECEDING SECTION envisioned con-
ditions where a non-Communist group was able
to capture power in a single attempt. Frequently,
however, such immediate success is not to be had.
The American-minded faction must work step by
step to gain control. In general, their approach
will be political, but minus the Communist unscru-
pulous and unethical aspects. The three main steps
are: discrediting of the Communist officers; cap-
turing of shop steward and committeemen positions;
and control of union meetings.

To discredit Communist officers, it is not neces-
sary to follow their method of a slanderous whis-
pering campaign. In most cases, telling the truth
about their activities is sufficiently damning and, of
course, much harder to deny. Their main weakness
will be neglect of the Local in the interest of
Communist activities. The Party is so exacting in
regard to its members that they are likely to spend
a great deal of time in doing work ordered by it.
The result is poor service at the Local office, neglect
of grievances, at least when the Communists feel
entrenched, and the cancellation of regular union
meetings. As a smoke screen, the Communists will

* 51

try to organize strikes, stoppages, "quickies," and
protest meetings, but this type of action soon loses
its effectiveness and increases unrest among the
members. In addition, close scrutiny of the Local's
financial matters will often furnish much damaging
material. The condition of the Local's treasury
should be contrasted to that of a well-run non-
Communist Local of the same union or within the
same locality. Moreover, Communists will make
many mistakes in running the union. They are not
supermen. Finally, the easily proved charges of
Communist affiliation should be circulated widely.
If the affiliation is known, but cannot be established
in a manner easily recognized by the general mem-
bership, such information should be aired only to
those discriminating enough to weigh the evidence.
Shop stewards stand or fall in direct relation to
their success in winning grievances. The normal
Communist steward is not too successful since he
aims to create disruption rather than harmony. The
result is that even sound complaints are often not
adjusted, since the foreman has learned to distrust
both the word and the judgment of such a steward.
These failures can be capitalized upon by an alert
union member in the department. He may insinuate
that better results could be obtained if the workers
handled their own grievances directly with the
foreman. Or they may be able to get a non-
Communist in the grievance committee to handle
them upon appeal. Or, finally, the non-Communist
in the department may be able to goad the shop
steward into letting him take up cases with the
foreman. He should have witnesses for any such
permission, however, lest he be charged with vi-
olating the union constitution or by-laws by dealing
directly with management in such matters.

Control of union meetings usually involves a
caucus to prepare issues and the bringing of suf-
ficient members to meetings. The caucus should be
well versed in parliamentary law and the various
tactics used by the Communists to run meetings.
Such a caucus prepares issues in detail before
meetings, outlining who is to make and who is to
second motions, give speeches, and call for the vote.

52 *

Above all, this caucus must be ready to handle
delaying tactics, so that meetings will not be pro-
longed unduly. They must appoint alert floor
leaders who are prepared to meet emergency situ-
ations and who will be followed intelligently by
other members of the group. Techniques of this
sort can scarcely be learned from books, although
excellent literature is available * The best method
is to obtain the guidance of a trained non-Com-
munist union leader. Labor schools are available in
many communities where such fundamentals can
be learned.

Special Difficulties

THE DIFFICULTIES of the struggle against
Communist control vary with localities and the
size of the plant. The problem is most severe where
the plant is large and its workers diverse in regard
to race, religion, and national origin. Under such
conditions, workers do not often have personal
knowledge of their officers, and factions are easily
formed. In smaller plants, with a uniform working
force, personal contacts are more frequent and
Communist infiltration correspondingly more diffi-
cult. The mechanical skill and general intelligence
of workers also enter into the situation. This is
particularly true in the matter of organizing^ a
caucus for union meetings. On the other hand, in-
telligent workers are often unwilling to enter into
the bitter struggle involved in ousting a Communist
group. Partly for this reason, Communism is strongly

* A brief study of parliamentary law has been prepared by
A. Claessens for the International Ladies Garment Workers
Union. (The A. B.C. of Parliamentary Law, I.L.G.W.U.,
3 West 16th St., New York City.) The same union publishes
a Handbook of Trade Union Methods. (Each 25tf.) The
United Automobile Workers (411 West Milwaukee, Detroit,
Mich.) has a pamphlet on shop steward duties. No com-
plete list of union pamphlets exists today, but the Labor
Education Service, Division of Labor Standards, U. S. Dept.
of Labor, is understood to be preparing such a list. In ad-
dition, it is publishing its own literature in the field.
Democracy in Trade Unions: A Survey with a Program of
Action, and supplement published by the American Civil
Liberties Union, 170 Fifth Ave., New York 10.

* 53

entrenched in the United Electrical Workers, the
United Public Workers of America, and in the New
York and Los Angeles Locals of the American News-
paper Guild. This situation is due more to a lack of
interest than a lack of ability to oust bad leader-
ship.*

Another special difficulty in ousting Communists
arises from their control of the election machinery.
It can be taken for granted that they will conduct
a dishonest election to maintain their power. If the
national union is controlled by non-Communists, it
is frequently possible for members to appeal to it
so that the election may be supervised. In other
situations, the election committee is picked by the
membership. If the opposition to Communists is
well organized, it is often able to control this com-
mittee. On the other hand, it is possible that Com-
munists control both the national union and the
Local. In such a case, the only remedy presently
available in most cases is secession of a large group
and the petition for the National Labor Relations
Board election for new representation. Such a dras-
tic remedy is often unsatisfactory, however, and a
better solution, some urge, would be outside super-
vision of elections.

CONCLUSION

The Communist-controlled union is basically dif-
ferent from any other labor union. The handling of
it requires fundamentally distinct attitudes and

techniques.

In dealing with such groups the following under-
lying points must be remembered:

I. That such a union is primarily a bridgehead
of a foreign power, Soviet Union leaders. When a

*To illustrate this point, a newspaper reporter quota one
of the best-known writers for the Philadelphia Record to the
effect that indifference on the part of the high-salaried re-
porters was largely responsible for the Guild .action wh^h
put three newspapers out of business m 1947. They rarey
attended union meetings. "If there is any moral in this,
U is to keep an eye on the Guild to see that there ,s always
a healthy opposition to any steam roller." Woshrngtan Post,
February 3, 1947, p. 6.

54 *

conflict arises between Soviet aims and American
ideals, the Communist union will support the former
and criticize American foreign and domestic policies.
A union of this type is a pliable instrument, when
needed, for military espionage and sabotage. It will
fit into the general Communist propaganda machine,
which aims to further the Soviet Union and deride
the United States. If a military conflict were to
arise, it will be a fifth column, attacking its own
people from within. This is why, as was noted
earlier, Communist labor leaders concentrate first
on strategic industries and occupations.

II. The labor movement under Communism is
an instrument for dislocating our economic and
social structure. Communists do not seek genuine
betterment of conditions. Rather they thrive upon
strife for its own sake. They would rather have
strikes than peaceful and generous settlement of
industrial disputes. They would prefer agitation to
the removal of grievances or social ills which afford
the excuse for agitation. Reasonable appeals or
sensible compromises mean nothing to them. They
seek a war to the finish with the business com-
munity and our way of life.

HI. The labor movement is to Communists a
broad foundation for all their other activities,
whether propaganda and "education," agitation
among minority groups, or infiltration of govern-
ment. From the labor movement, they hope to gain
militant members. Its treasuries are drained of funds
for various Party-controlled organizations and pro-
grams. This is the mass which is to be guided and
deceived into ultimate revolution and immediate
disruption of the present economic system.

In the light of these facts the employer cannot
be complacent about the problem of Communism in
labor. It would be fatal short-sightedness if he
were so preoccupied with immediate problems that
he overlooked the master strategy and the under-
lying motivation. And it would be quite unfortunate
if he were to feel that normal techniques and usual
procedures in industrial relations would be adequate
to meet problems of this nature.

* 55

The analysis given here leads to one primary
conclusion, that the ousting of Communists from
labor unions is a highly complex problem. It is
mainly a task for the workers themselves. With
them, good will is essential but not enough. Skill,
experience, and intelligence are required to perfect
the organization needed to beat a Communist po-
litical machine. In this struggle, the employer can
help substantially, even though indirectly. If he is
alert to Communist tactics, vigilant in avoiding
their traps, and careful not to give them help, he will
encourage the decent element in the union to re-
move subversive leaders. The fact that his aid is
indirect and often of the negative type does not
make it the less important or essential. On the
contrary, an intelligent application of the principles
outlined here would contribute tremendously to the
task. But, if the employer is not awake, the burden
of the non-Communist opposition is increased
many fold.

The difficulties to be found and overcome should
not be exaggerated. The underlying realities of the
situation all favor the non-Communist opposition.
The majority of the workers oppose Communism
and wish honest union leadership. The Communists
can usually be relied upon to be their own best
enemies, through their neglect of duty and intense
interest in outside matters. A well-informed em-
ployer can do much, without interfering with union
activities or otherwise running afoul of the Wagner
Act. General public sentiment today runs against
Communists, their goals, and their methods. Ac-
cordingly, patience, skill and diligence will produce
results which should be most gratifying.

From the larger point of view, the cleansing of
the labor movement of Communism will have im-
portant results for the entire country. It will lead
to sounder, more peaceful, and more reasonable
labor-management relations. Furthermore, it will
hurt the Communists badly in their fifth-column
work for the Soviet Union. Of their four main types
of activity — labor, minority groups, government,
and propaganda — labor is considered basic. The re-
moval of this support will cripple their work in other

56 *

l

fields, especially if direct attacks along all these
lines are made simultaneously. Countermeasures
are apt to be ineffective unless such simultaneous
efforts are made on all fronts.

Communism and Communists have nothing to
offer to the American people. Machiavelli pointed
out four hundred years ago that, in the beginning,
a disease is hard to diagnose and easy to cure; but
if neglected it becomes easy to diagnose and hard
to cure. It is in this spirit that the Chamber of
Commerce submits this report to the American
people.

57

ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY*

KIAVCHENKO. V.CTOR A '^^SP^- ^
Scribner), 1946, $3^0. The autoc , g v d ^ K _

official who t^ted Amencan freedom ^^

main here. A -f^X"f Soviet officials,
and the espionage activities 01

Strib»er), 1946, $!.». A» "*"„„„„ pi.uslbly the

ti,^ TVuift 4bowt American
6.TIOW, BENJAMIN, I C«*»-" ** g^ and Co ., Inc.),
ST?!? Sank revdaUons of an es-Communist ;
considerable material on labor.

VAlT1N . JAN Co^^^^bS^.^
^MStfW-^51* sabota S e, and

revolutionary tactics.
Plain «* (240 Madison Avenue ^i*S
$3.00 per »*"^iSi direction. Deals
JrSrin^os^CoUunist activities. Strong

recommended.

^ * i«i Q+rPPt New York 3), Weekly,

Th . Now Leader (7 ^fS^ publication which to

$3.00 per year A Saaa iu ^ opposing otah .

SL^^hoXSU -called democratic so-

cialism.

„ . ft M Dent 224 Bloor St. W.,

rA^sfirasfiss- on *» *****

of America, New York), 1946^ Um in the

the Institute). A ^f^^S accurate and
American labor movement. Analysis nig y
recommendations valuable.

„al of Commerce Chicago^ 1 .f^^^ q{ .^ yld _
des on Communism. The aumo : 8 reference

- uals and organizations. Accurate.
WO rk on names of front groups.

Cc mmU n-,„ Power VS^S^S

!

unions, and Communist labor leaders. An excellent rec-
ord.

Union Wreckers in Our Meeting Halls by H. W. Bennett (Los
Angeles: 540 Maple Ave.), 1946, 5#. Prepared by a
member of a union, gives firsthand experience.

Communism: A World Menace by John F. Cronin (Washing-
ton; National Catholic Welfare Conference), 1947, lOtf.
Excellent introduction to the philosophy and tactics of
Communists at home and abroad.

Exposing the Red Threat to Free Enterprise and Individual
Liberty by Frederick Woltman (New York: New York
World Telegram), 1947. Illustration of the type of
photostatic reproduction of newspaper headlines, news
stories, and signed articles, which may be useful in
handling a local situation.

How to Spot a Communist by Karl Baarslag, AMERICAN
LEGION magazine, January 1947. p. 9 and February,
p. 19. 2S#, quantity discount. Tells how Communists
operate inside labor unions in terms of the caucus, tac-
tics and strategy. Very useful to anti-communist labor
leaders and union members. Also available in pamphlet
form from Argus Publishing Co., Box 577, Benjamin
Franklin Sta., Washington. D. C.

Communist Infiltration in the United States (Washington:
Chamber of Commerce of the USA), 1946, Deluxe and
small-sized editions, 25c 4 and 10c\ discount on quantity
orders. A Congressional Committee states: "Great credit
should be given to the United States Chamber of Com-
merce for ... a highly readable and factual treatise.
. . . Local chambers of commerce, individual business-
men, patriotic organizations, fraternal groups, and our
churches can render a real public service at slight ex-
pense by making available to all students in high schools
and colleges and to citizens generally the highly informa-
tive treatment on Communism now available from the
United States Chamber of Commerce." *

Communists Within the Government: THE FACTS AND A PRO-
GRAM (Washington: Chamber of Commerce of the
USA), 1947, 504 single copy, discount on quantity
orders. Dealing primarily with Communist infiltration
into the Government service and setting forth a program
of countermeasures. Contains excellent evidence on the
role which pro-communist labor unions have played in
the process of infiltrating the Government.

American Competitive Enterprise System (Washington: Cham-
ber of Commerce of the USA) , 10C\ quantity discount.
Brief statement of the essentials of our economic system
designed especially for the interested workman, foreman
and beginning economics student. An industrialist who
used 10,000 copies states: "It is the best statement,
within the space used, of the fundamentals of our system
which I have seen."

COMMITTEE ON SOCIALISM AND
COMMUNISM, 1946-1947

Francis P, Matthews, Chairman,
Chairman, Securities Acceptance Corp.,
Omaha, Nebraska

Thomas C. Boushall, President,
Bank of Virginia,
Richmond 16, Virginia

Fred L. Conklin, President,

Provident Life Insurance Company,
Bismarck, North Dakota

Carlyle Fraser, President,
Genuine Parts Company,
Atlanta, Georgia

Richard K. Lane, President,

Public Service Company of Oklahoma,
Tulsa, Oklahoma

Emerson P. Schmidt, Secretary,
Director, Economic Research Department,
Chamber of Commerce of the USA,
Washington 6, D. C.

*'

* For additional reading matter, consult the extended bibliography
in this document.

60